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STATE OF NEW YORK- BOARD OF PAROLE 
ADMINISTRATIVE APPEAL DECISION NOTICE 
Name: Infantino, Robert Facility: Riverview CF 
NYSID: 
DIN: 10-R-2101 
Appearances: 
Decision appealed: 
Board Member(s) 
who participated: 
Papers considered: 
Appeal 
Control No.: 
Robert Infantino (iOR2101) 
Riverview Correctional Facility 
1110 Tibbits Drive, Box 15 8 
Ogdensburg, New York 13669 
12-103-18 B 
December 2018 decision, denying discretionary release and imposing a hold of 24 
months. 
Berliner, Davis. 
Appellant's Briefreceived February 26, 2019 
Appeals Unit Review: Statement of the Appeals Unit's Findings and Recommendation 
Records relied upon: Pre-Sentence Investigation Report, Parole !\oard Report, Interview Transcript, Parole 
Board Release Decision Notice (Fonn 9026), COMPAS instrument, Offender Case 
Plan. 
The undersigned detennine that the decision appealed is hereby: 
_Vacated, remanded for de novo interview _Modified to ___ _ 
Vacated, remanded for de novo interview _Modified to ___ _ 
_ Vacated, remanded for de novo interview _Modified to _ __ _ 
If the Final Determination is at variance wit~ Findings and Recommendation of Appeals Unit, written 
reasons for the Parole Board's determination .!!!!!.§! be annexed hereto. 
This Final Determination, the related Statement of the Appeals Unit's Findings and the separa{e .findings of 
the Parole Board, if any, were mailed to the Inmate and the Inmate's Counsel, if any, on ~/ID/fl 66 . 
Distribution: Appeals Unit - Appellant - Appellant's Counsel - Inst. Parole File. - Central File 
P-2002(B) (11/2018) 
STATE OF NEW YORK – BOARD OF PAROLE 
APPEALS UNIT FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATION
Name: Infantino, Robert  DIN: 10-R-2101
Facility: Riverview CF AC No.: 12-103-18 B
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Appellant challenges the December 2018 determination of the Board, denying release and 
imposing a 24-month hold. 
Appellant was sentenced to an aggregate term of imprisonment of 5 to 15 years after having 
been convicted by guilty plea of numerous counts of Unlawful Surveillance 2nd and Possessing a 
Sexual Performance by a Child.   
Appellant raises the following issues in his brief: (1) the Board’s decision was arbitrary 
and capricious, made in violation of applicable legal authority, and relied too heavily upon the 
serious nature of Appellant’s crimes of conviction; (2) Appellant’s programming, positive 
accomplishments, rehabilitative efforts, insight and remorse, letters of support, receipt of an 
Earned Eligibility Certificate (EEC), certain COMPAS scores, and release plans were not given 
sufficient consideration by the Board; (3) the Board’s decision lacked sufficient detail; (4) certain 
issues were not discussed during the interview; (5) the Board’s decision was tantamount to a 
resentencing of Appellant; (6) the Board’s decision was predetermined; and (7) the presentence 
investigation report contained errors. 
As to the first two issues, Executive Law §259-i(2)(c)(A) requires the Board to consider 
criteria which is relevant to the specific inmate, including, but not limited to, the inmate’s 
institutional record and criminal behavior.  People ex rel. Herbert v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 
97 A.D.2d 128, 468 N.Y.S.2d 881 (1st Dept. 1983).  While consideration of these factors is 
mandatory, “the ultimate decision to parole a prisoner is discretionary.”  Matter of Silmon v. Travis, 
95 N.Y.2d 470, 477.  Thus, it is well settled that the weight to be accorded the requisite factors is 
solely within the Board’s discretion.  See, e.g., Matter of Delacruz v. Annucci, 122 A.D.3d 1413, 
997 N.Y.S.2d 872 (4th Dept. 2014); Matter of Hamilton, 119 A.D.3d at 1271; Matter of Garcia v. 
New York State Div. of Parole, 239 A.D.2d 235, 239, 657 N.Y.S.2d 415, 418 (1st Dept. 1997).  
The Board need not explicitly refer to each factor in its decision, nor give them equal weight.  Matter 
of Betancourt v. Stanford, 148 A.D.3d 1497, 49 N.Y.S.3d 315 (3d Dept. 2017); Matter of LeGeros 
v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 139 A.D.3d 1068, 30 N.Y.S.3d 834 (2d Dept. 2016); Matter of 
Phillips v. Dennison, 41 A.D.3d 17.  In the absence of a convincing demonstration that the Board 
did not consider the statutory factors, it must be presumed that the Board fulfilled its duty.  Matter 
of Fuchino v. Herbert, 255 A.D.2d 914, 914, 680 N.Y.S.2d 389, 390 (4th Dept. 1998); Matter of 
McLain v. New York State Div. of Parole, 204 A.D.2d 456, 611 N.Y.S.2d 629 (2d Dept. 1994); 
Matter of McKee v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 157 A.D.2d 944, 945, 550 N.Y.S.2d 204, 205 
(3d Dept. 1990); People ex rel. Herbert, 97 A.D.2d 128. 
Appellant’s receipt of an EEC does not automatically guarantee his release, and it does not 
eliminate consideration of the statutory factors including the instant offense.  Matter of Milling v. 
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Berbary, 31 A.D.3d 1202, 1203, 819 N.Y.S.2d 373, 374 (4th Dept.), lv. denied, 7 N.Y.3d 808, 809, 
822 N.Y.S.2d 481 (2006); Matter of White v. Dennison, 29 A.D.3d 1144, 814 N.Y.S.2d 393 (3d 
Dept. 2006); Matter of Barad v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 275 A.D.2d 856, 713 N.Y.S.2d 
775, 776 (3d Dept. 2000), lv. denied, 96 N.Y.2d 702, 722 N.Y.S.2d 793 (2001).  Where an inmate 
has been awarded an EEC, the Board may deny release to parole on a finding that there is a 
reasonable probability that, if such inmate is released, the inmate will not live and remain at liberty 
without violating the law, and that his release is not compatible with the welfare of society.  
Correction Law §805; Executive Law §259-i(2)(c)(A); Matter of Heitman v. New York State Bd. 
of Parole, 214 A.D.2d 673, 625 N.Y.S.2d 264 (2d Dept. 1995); Matter of Salcedo v. Ross, 183 
A.D.2d 771, 771, 583 N.Y.S.2d 502, 503 (1st Dept. 1992); Matter of Walker v. Russi, 176 A.D.2d 
1185, 576 N.Y.S.2d 51 (3d Dept. 1991), appeal dismissed, 79 N.Y.2d 89 7, 581 N.Y.S.2d 660 
(1992).  The standard set forth in Executive Law §259-i(2)(c)(A) requiring consideration of 
whether the inmate’s release will so deprecate the seriousness of his crime as to undermine respect 
for the law does not apply in cases where an EEC has been awarded.   
In 2011, the law was amended to require procedures incorporating risk and needs principles 
to “assist” the Board in making parole release decisions.  Executive Law § 259–c(4); 9 N.Y.C.R.R. 
§8002.2(a).  The Board satisfies this requirement in part by using the COMPAS instrument.  Matter 
of Montane v. Evans, 116 A.D.3d 197, 202, 981 N.Y.S.2d 866, 870 (3d Dept. 2014); see also 
Matter of Hawthorne v. Stanford, 135 A.D.3d 1036, 1042, 22 N.Y.S.3d 640, 645 (3d Dept. 2016); 
Matter of LeGeros v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 139 A.D.3d 1068, 30 N.Y.S.3d 834 (2d Dept. 
2016); Matter of Robles v. Fischer, 117 A.D.3d 1558, 1559, 985 N.Y.S.2d 386, 387 (4th Dept. 
2014).  Notably, the 2011 amendments did not eliminate the requirement that the Board conduct a 
case-by-case review of each inmate by considering the statutory factors including the instant 
offense.  The amendments also did not change the applicable substantive standards that the Board 
is required to apply when deciding whether to grant parole. See Executive Law 
§259-i(2)(c)(A).  Thus, the COMPAS instrument cannot mandate a particular result.  Matter of 
King v. Stanford, 137 A.D.3d 1396, 26 N.Y.S.3d 815 (3d Dept. 2016).  Rather, the COMPAS is an 
additional consideration that the Board must weigh along with applicable statutory factors. See 
Matter of Rivera v. N.Y. State Div. of Parole, 119 A.D.3d 1107, 1108, 990 N.Y.S.2d 295 (3d Dept. 
2014); accord Matter of Dawes v. Annucci, 122 A.D.3d 1059, 994 N.Y.S.2d 747 (3d Dept. 2014); 
see also Matter of Gonzalvo v. Stanford, 153 A.D.3d 1021, 56 N.Y.S.3d 896 (3d Dept. 2017).  
Furthermore, declining to afford the COMPAS controlling weight does not violate the 2011 
amendments. Matter of King v. Stanford, 137 A.D.3d 1396, 26 N.Y.S.3d 815 (3d Dept. 2016). 
It is neither arbitrary nor capricious for the Board to consider Appellant’s remorse and 
insight relative to his crime of conviction. Matter of Silmon v. Travis, 95 N.Y.2d 470, 718 
N.Y.S.2d 704 (2000); Matter of Applegate v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 164 A.D.3d 996, 997, 
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82 N.Y.S.3d 240 (3d Dept. 2018) (minimization of crimes); Matter of Beodeker v. Stanford, 164 
A.D.3d 1555, 82 N.Y.S.3d 669 (3d Dept. 2018) (limited expression of remorse); Matter of 
Crawford v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 144 A.D.3d 1308, 46 N.Y.S.3d 228 (3d Dept. 2016) 
(lack of insight and failure to accept responsibility), lv. denied, 29 N.Y.3d 901 (2017); Matter of 
Phillips v. Dennison, 41 A.D.3d 17, 23, 834 N.Y.S.2d 121 (1st Dept. 2007) (limited insight and 
remorse); Matter of Almeyda v. New York State Div. of Parole, 290 A.D.2d 505, 736 N.Y.S.2d 
275 (2d Dept. 2002) (limited insight into why crime committed).  Insight and remorse are relevant 
not only to rehabilitative progress but also to whether release would deprecate the severity of the 
offense.  Matter of Phillips v. Dennison, 41 A.D.3d 17, 23, 834 N.Y.S.2d 121, 125 (1st Dept. 
2007).  Inasmuch as Appellant disputes the Board’s finding with respect to insight and remorse, it 
was well within the Board’s authority to make an assessment of Appellant’s credibility (Matter of 
Siao-Pao v. Dennison, 51 A.D.3d 105, 108, 854 N.Y.S.2d 348, 351 (1st Dept.), aff’d, 11 N.Y.3d 
777, 866 N.Y.S.2d 602 (2008)).  Also, the Board is permitted to conclude that the serious nature of 
the inmate’s offense, as well as limited insight and/or remorse, outweigh other factors.  See, e.g., 
Matter of Silmon v. Travis, 95 N.Y.2d 470, 478, 718 N.Y.S.2d 704 (2000), aff’g 266 A.D.2d 296, 
297, 698 N.Y.S.2d 685, 686 (2d Dept. 1999); Matter of Beodeker v. Stanford, 164 A.D.3d 1555, 
82 N.Y.S.3d 669 (3d Dept. 2018); Matter of Crawford v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 144 
A.D.3d 1308, 46 N.Y.S.3d 228 (3d Dept. 2016), lv. denied, 29 N.Y.3d 901, 57 N.Y.S.3d 704 
(2017); Matter of Almeyda v. New York State Div. of Parole, 290 A.D.2d 505, 736 N.Y.S.2d 275 
(2d Dept. 2002); Matter of Serrano v. N.Y. State Exec. Dep't-Div. of Parole, 261 A.D.2d 163, 164, 
689 N.Y.S.2d 504, 505 (1st Dept. 1999). 
As to the third issue, the Board’s decision satisfied the criteria set out in Executive Law 
§259-i(2)(a) and 9 N.Y.C.R.R. §8002.3(d), as it was sufficiently detailed to inform the inmate of the 
reasons for the denial of parole.  Matter of Applegate v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 164 A.D.3d 
996, 997, 82 N.Y.S.3d 240 (3d Dept. 2018); Matter of Kozlowski v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 
108 A.D.3d 435, 968 N.Y.S.2d 87 (1st Dept. 2013); Matter of Little v. Travis, 15 A.D.3d 698, 788 
N.Y.S.2d 628 (3d Dept. 2005); Matter of Davis v. Travis, 292 A.D.2d 742, 739 N.Y.S.2d 300 (3d 
Dept. 2002); People ex rel. Herbert v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 97 A.D.2d 128, 468 N.Y.S.2d 
881 (1st Dept. 1983).   
             As to the fourth issue, Appellant was provided the opportunity to discuss with the Board 
during the interview any issues of interest, and cannot now be heard to complain that certain issues 
were not discussed, or the extent to which certain issues were discussed. See Matter of Serna v. 
New York State Division of Parole, 279 A.D.2d 684, 719 N.Y.S. 2d 166  (3d Dept. 2001); Matter 
of Garcia v. New York State Div. of Parole, 239 A.D.2d 235, 657 N.Y.S.2d 415 (1st Dept. 1997).   
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As to the fifth issue, Appellant’s assertion that the denial of parole release amounted to an 
improper resentencing is without merit inasmuch as the Board fulfilled its obligation to determine 
the propriety of release per Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A) and after considering the factors set 
forth therein. See Executive Law § 259 et seq.; Penal Law § 70.40; Matter of Murray v. Evans, 83 
A.D.3d 1320, 920 N.Y.S.2d 745 (3d Dept. 2011); Matter of Crews v. New York State Exec. Dept. 
Bd. of Parole Appeals Unit, 281 A.D.2d 672, 720 N.Y.S.2d 855 (3d Dept. 2001).  Appellant has 
not in any manner been resentenced.  Matter of Mullins v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 136 
A.D.3d 1141, 1142, 25 N.Y.S.3d 698 (3d Dept. 2016).
As to the sixth issue, There is a presumption of honesty and integrity that attaches to judges 
and administrative fact-finders.  See People ex. rel. Johnson v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 180 
A.D.2d 914 (3d Dept. 1992). The Board is presumed to have followed applicable statutory 
requirements and internal policies when making decisions regarding the suitability of an inmate’s 
possible release to parole supervision. See Garner v. Jones, 529 U.S. 244 (2000).  There is no evidence 
that the Board’s decision was predetermined.  See Matter of Hakim-Zaki v. New York State Div. of 
Parole, 29 A.D.3d 1190 (3d Dept. 2006); Matter of Guerin v. New York State Div. of Parole, 276 
A.D.2d 899 (3d Dept. 2000).   
As to the seventh issue, pursuant to both statutory and regulatory requirements, the Board 
must consider Appellant’s pre-sentence investigation report when assessing an inmate’s suitability 
for possible release back into the community. See Executive Law §259-i(2)(c)(A); 9 N.Y.C.R.R. 
§8002.2(d)(1),(7). It is further noted that because Appellant did not timely challenge the 
information contained in the pre-sentence investigation report before the sentencing court, he is 
precluded from asserting that the Board was not entitled to rely upon the information contained 
therein. Sutherland v. Alexander, 64 A.D.3d 1028 (3d Dept. 2009); Matter of Champion v. 
Dennison, 40 AD3d 1181 (2007), leave dismissed, 9 NY3d 913 (2007); Matter of Cox v. New 
York State Div. of Parole, 11 AD3d 766 (2004), leave denied, 4 NY3d 703 (2005). 
Recommendation:  Affirm. 
